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Abstract 
This paper calculates the cost of an unemployment shock in terms of family welfare for married 
and single families separately and by education level. We find that, overall, families face an 
average annualized expected dollar equivalent welfare loss of $1,156 when the unemployment 
rate rises by one-percentage point. The average welfare loss for married families is greater than 
the average loss for single families and increases in education. We then estimate that a price 
level increase of 1.8 percent generates the same amount of welfare loss. We also find that the 
average welfare loss from a shock to prices vs. a shock to unemployment rises with income. 
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Cost of Unemployment and Price Changes on Family Welfare:  
A Microsimulation Analysis 
 
1 Introduction and Background 
 The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the welfare cost of a shock to unemployment for 
families with different characteristics. We apply the microsimulation methodology used by 
(Hotchkiss, Moore, and Rios-Avila 2012; Hotchkiss et al. 2017), and others, to estimate 
parameters of a labor supply model within the context of a family utility framework for married 
couple households, and within the context of a unitary utility framework for single households.1  
Estimated parameters from the utility model will be used to simulate the expected welfare loss 
from a rise in the aggregate unemployment rate, with the recognition that each person's 
probability of unemployment is impacted differently by a softening of the labor market.  
 Others have explored the costs of unemployment almost exclusively through a 
macroeconomic lens. Okun's Law (Okun 1962) is often used to describe the loss in output that is 
generated from an additional one-percentage point rise in the unemployment rate. Gordon, 
Nordhaus, and Poole (1973) detail the deficiencies of Okun's Law (alone) for measuring the 
welfare effects of a rise in the unemployment rate because the relationship does not account for 
the value of non-market activity. And rather than explore the cost of a specific shock to 
unemployment, some focus more on the welfare costs of economic volatility (e.g. Lucas 1991; 
Krusell and Smith 1999). 
 An exception to the macroeconomic approach to measuring the welfare costs of 
unemployment is found in Hurd (1980). Hurd uses estimated individual labor supply elasticities 
(or, rather, the slope of the labor supply function) to calculate the payment required to make a 
                                                
1 Microsimulation is a popular methodology for assessing the impact of policy changes on 
welfare (for example, see Fiorio 2008; Blundell et al. 2000; Bahl et al. 1993; Blundell 1992). 
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person indifferent between working the desired hours at a prevailing wage rate, or being forced 
to work fewer hours than desired because of unemployment. This payment is interpreted as the 
cost of unemployment. Our methodology employs a similar, but more complete, strategy in that 
we estimate the welfare loss of deviating from desired hours, but we estimate utility function 
parameters in order to calculate actual loss in welfare (i.e., utility) as opposed to just loss in 
income that would come from unemployment. Among other things, this allows us to account for 
any potential welfare gain from an increase in non-market activity that comes with non-
employment. The methodology also allows a comparison of welfare loss across families of 
different characteristics irrespective of the actual utility level of those families (either 
independently or relative to one another). 
 DiTella, MacCulloch, and Oswald (2001) also offer an estimate of the utility-constant 
cost of unemployment and provide a segue to the second part of the analysis in this paper. They 
assess the relative importance of high unemployment vs. high inflation in explaining variations 
in demographic-neutral aggregate levels of satisfaction across countries and time. They find that 
unemployment is more important than inflation in reducing overall satisfaction. They motivate 
their analysis by stating that, "... reducing inflation is often costly, in terms of extra 
unemployment...," (DiTella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2001, 335). This trade-off is also 
acknowledged by Gordon, Nordhaus, and Poole (1973) as a motivation for undertaking their 
assessment of the welfare cost of higher unemployment. However, they note that their 
assessment will not take account of, "...the benefits associated with the lower inflation rate made 
possible by higher unemployment," (p. 135).2 
                                                
2 In spite of this implied negative relationship between unemployment and inflation, Berentsen, 
Menzio, and Wright (2011) identify a positive relationship between unemployment and inflation 
in very low frequency data (the long run). 
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 The potential trade-off between unemployment and inflation suggested by these papers is 
of particular interest to U.S. Federal Reserve monetary policy makers whose actions are guided 
by what is know as the "Dual Mandate" of full employment and stable prices, which is spelled 
out in Section 2A of the Federal Reserve Act: 
“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market 
Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate 
with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the 
goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” 3 
 
While we do not model inflation, per se, in this paper, the second part of our analysis makes use 
of the microsimulation to also estimate the size of an unanticipated shock to prices that would 
generate the same welfare loss as a one percentage-point shock to unemployment. Since the only 
consumption price in the model is the numeraire price of consumption, we simulate a price shock 
by adjusting the value of the other components of the model that enter in real dollars -- wages 
and non-labor income. We will then be able to say something about how the individual family 
views the trade off between rising unemployment and rising prices. To the extent that the Fed is 
concerned with the distributional implications of monetary policy, such as income inequality 
(e.g., Bernanke 2015; Nakajima 2015; Amaral 2017), how the welfare cost of unemployment and 
price level changes differs across demographic characteristics may also be of interest to 
monetary policy makers.   
 We find that the annualized expected welfare loss generated by a one-percentage point 
shock to the unemployment rate is equivalent to $1,156, on average across all families. And even 
though the probability of unemployment is less for those with higher education, their potential 
income loss is greater, making the expected welfare loss for those with higher education greater 
than for those with less education. In addition, single families' expected loss is less than that of 
                                                
3 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/fract.htm. 
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married families. This lower expected loss for singles translates into a lower equivalent 
unanticipated price level increase for singles than for married families; single families are only 
willing to tolerate a smaller increase in prices to avoid unemployment than married families are. 
This result is consistent with the conclusions of Burdett et al. (2016), who find that inflation is 
more costly for singles because, "...being single is cash intensive" (p. 337); also see Dong, Sun, 
and Wright (2015). 
2 Methodology 
 The main advantage to the theoretical framework we employ for this exercise is that it is 
constructed from a standard joint (unitary for singles) family utility model. For married couples, 
labor supply is jointly estimated. The utility function does not include unemployment as a direct 
input in the optimization problem.4 However, changes in unemployment and prices can be 
brought to bear on the welfare outcome by simulating the impact these environmental changes 
have on behavior and family utility 
 2.1 Family Utility Framework 
 The model described in this section nests the more simple case of single households. 
Empirically, the single family version of the model implies constraining hours and wages of the 
second household member to zero, as well as constraining all utility parameters concerning the 
second member to be zero.  
 Family labor supply decisions are modeled in a neoclassical joint utility framework. This 
model can be thought of as a reduced-form specification of family decision-making. The model 
yields a clear-cut expression of family welfare that allows for cross wage effects on each 
                                                
4 In spite of the insistence by Hall (1981, 432) that, "inflation is an outcome of economic 
processes, not an exogenous causal influence," it is certainly exogenous to an individual family's 
decision making process. 
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member's labor supply decision. The assumption of joint family utility (or, "collective" utility) is 
often rejected in favor of a bargaining structure for modeling intra-familial decisions making (for 
example, see Apps and Rees 2009; McElroy 1990). However, there is evidence that the choice of 
structure for household decision making has very little implication for conclusions in 
microsimulation exercises (see Moreau and Bargain 2005). In addition, Blundell et al. (2007) 
find that both collective and bargaining models are consistent with their household labor supply 
model estimated in the U.K.  
 Within the framework of the neoclassical family labor supply model, a family maximizes 
a utility function that represents household welfare. Assuming, for simplicity, that there are only 
two working members of the household (husband and wife), the family chooses levels of non-
market time (e.g., leisure, household production) for each member and a joint consumption level 
in order to solve the following problem:5 max!!,!!,! 𝑈 = 𝑈 𝐿!, 𝐿!,𝐶    𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑜  𝐶 = 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌 . (1) 
 
Define T as total time available for an individual; 𝐿! = 𝑇 − ℎ! will be referred to as the 
husband's non-market time, and 𝐿! = 𝑇 − ℎ! will be referred to as the wife's non-market time; ℎ! is the labor supply of the husband; ℎ! is the labor supply of the wife; C is total money income 
(or consumption with price equal to one); 𝑤! and 𝑤! are the husband's and wife's after-tax 
market wage, respectively; and Y is non-labor income. 𝐿! and 𝐿! correspond to all uses of non-
market time, including home production activities.6 In addition, the model does not distinguish 
                                                
5 Sample construction excludes families with unmarried, same- or opposite-sex adults/partners. 
There are not enough occurrences to produce reliable utility function parameters for this family 
type. This exclusion also ensures a clean interpretation of individual family members' 
contributions to leisure/household production and total consumption. 
6 Apps and Rees (2009) are highly critical of family utility models that do not include measures 
of household production, but even they acknowledge that not much can be done without the 
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between unemployment and non-participation; both states are included in the non-employment 
status. The implications of this are discussed later in section 2.3. 
 The solution to the maximization problem in equation (1) can be expressed in terms of 
the indirect utility function, which is solely a function of the wages of the husband and wife and 
non-labor income of the family: 𝑉 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌 = 𝑈 𝑇 − ℎ!∗ 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌 , 𝑇 − ℎ!∗ 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌 ,                                                                       𝑤!ℎ!∗ 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌 + 𝑤!ℎ!∗ 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌 + 𝑌  , (2) 
where ℎ!∗ 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌  and ℎ!∗ 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌  correspond to the optimal labor supply equations (desired 
hours) for the husband and wife, respectively. By totally differentiating the indirect utility 
function, we can simulate the change in welfare that results from changes in optimal hours of 
work and consumption in response to changes in wages and non-labor income (also see Apps 
and Rees 2009, 263): 𝑑𝑉 = −𝑈!𝑑ℎ!∗ − 𝑈!𝑑ℎ!∗ + 𝑈!𝑑𝐶∗ , (3) 
where 𝑈! and 𝑈! are the family's marginal utility of the husband's and wife's non-market time, 
respectively, and 𝑈! is the family's marginal utility of consumption. It is this equation that gives 
us the change in family welfare that will result from a shock to unemployment or a shock to 
prices. It is clear from equation (3) that the change in welfare not only depends on the individual 
labor supply responses, but also on the family's marginal evaluation of a change in non-market 
time and income.  
 2.2 Estimation of Utility Function Parameters and Labor Supply Elasticities 
 Simulating the impact on family welfare of higher unemployment and an unanticipated 
shock to prices requires the estimation of labor supply elasticities of each family member with 
                                                                                                                                                       
availability of richer data (p. 108). Since the focus of the analysis in this paper is utility at the 
household level, the absence of home production activities is not crucial.  
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respect to changes in their own and each other's (in the case of married-couple families) wages, 
elasticities with respect to non-labor family income, as well as the changes in the probability of 
employment (extensive margin elasticities); i.e., the probability of being at an interior solution on 
the budget constraint. There are many divergent empirical issues raised in the literature related to 
estimating labor supply elasticities. While the focus of this paper is on the simulation exercise 
itself, the simulation does require labor supply elasticities and it is, therefore, worthwhile to 
address some of the empirical issues; most of these issues, including the potential for 
endogeneity of wages and non-labor income, are addressed in detail in Appendix A. The goal 
here is to produce reasonable labor supply elasticities that are consistent with the literature. 
Toward that end, the methodology adopted takes the simplest approach possible while 
maintaining basic theoretical and empirical integrity. 
 The requirement of simplicity here primarily derives from the goal of quantifying the 
family-level utility changes. In order to obtain estimates of the pieces of the change in utility in 
equation (3) a specific functional form of utility must be specified. Following others (e.g., 
Hotchkiss, Moore, and Rios-Avila 2012; Hotchkiss, Kassis, and Moore 1997; Heim 2009; 
Ransom 1987), we estimate a quadratic form of the utility function:     𝑈 𝑍 = 𝛼 𝑍 − (1 2)𝑍!Β𝑍 , (4) 
where Z is a vector with elements 𝑍! = 𝑇 − ℎ!, 𝑍! = 𝑇 − ℎ!, and 𝑍! = 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌;  is 
a vector of parameters and Β is a symmetric matrix of parameters. This functional form has the 
advantage of being a flexible functional form in the sense that it can be thought of as a second 
order approximation to an arbitrary utility function (and when the second order conditions with 
respect to non-market time comply with 𝑈!! < 0,𝑈!! < 0  &  𝑈!! ∗ 𝑈!! > 𝑈!"!  it is well-
behaved). In addition, it is possible to produce analytical closed-form solutions for both the 
α
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husband's and wife's labor supply functions. Obtaining the first order conditions of this 
unconstrained maximization problem results in a system of equations linear in ℎ: 
!!!ℎ! = Ω!ℎ! + Ω!ℎ! + Ω!=0 (5) !!!ℎ! = Ω!ℎ! + Ω!ℎ! + Ω!=0 (6) 
This system can be solved simultaneously, and the desired hours become ℎ!∗ = 𝑓 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌  and ℎ!∗ = 𝑔 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌 , which represent the desired number of hours the members of a household 
would like to work, given the parameters that define their household utility function, given 
wages and non-labor income. Details of this derivation are reported in Appendix B.  
 Observed hours (ℎ), however, might differ from the optimum hours due to stochastic 
errors, such that: ℎ! = ℎ!∗ + 𝑒!          𝑖𝑓  ℎ!∗ + 𝑒! > 00                                  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒    ℎ! = ℎ!∗ + 𝑒!          𝑖𝑓  ℎ!∗ + 𝑒! > 00                                  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  ,       (7) 
where we assume that 𝑒!, 𝑒!  follows a bivariate Normal distribution with mean 0 and 
covariance matrix ∑ . This model can be thought of as a simultaneous Tobit model, with working 
hours censored at zero, where we have four kinds of families: those where both husband and 
wife work, those where only one of the spouses works (two cases), and those where neither of 
them work. (Of course, for singles, this simplifies to two cases -- the individual working or not 
working.)  Allowing for hours adjustment along the extensive margin for the wife when 
assessing labor supply responses to wage changes have been found to make a significant 
difference when assessing total labor supply response (for example, see Heim 2009; Eissa, 
Kleven, and Kreiner 2008), however, extensive margin hours adjustments appear to be 
unimportant for men (for example, see Heim 2009; Blundell et al. 1988). Considering the 
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simulation of possible unemployment for both men and women, allowing for husbands with zero 
hours of work is important, so they will be included in the analysis. 
 Allowing for the presence of non-workers raises one empirical issue identified by Keane 
(2011) that must be addressed: market wages are not observed for individuals who do not work. 
To obtain estimates of those wages, we take the standard approach in the literature of estimating 
a selectivity-corrected wage equation (Heckman 1974) using regressors observable for both 
working and non-working individuals.7  The resulting parameter estimates are then used to 
predict wages for non-working men and women based on their observable characteristics.  
 The maximum likelihood function corresponding to the joint labor supply optimization 
problem can be written as follows: 
𝐿 = 1𝜎!𝜎! 𝜓 ℎ! − ℎ!∗𝜎!    , ℎ! − ℎ!∗𝜎! ,𝜌 !!!,!!!!!!!  
∗ 1𝜎! 𝜑 ℎ! − ℎ!∗𝜎! 1−Φ 𝜎!ℎ!∗ − 𝜌𝜎! ℎ! − ℎ!∗𝜎!𝜎! 1− 𝜌! !!!,!!!  
∗ !!!𝜑 !!!!!∗!! 1−Φ !!!!∗!!!! !!!!!∗!!!! !!!! !!!,!!! ∗Ψ   !!!∗!!    ,   !!!∗!! ,𝜌 !!!,!!!     , (8) 
where 𝜑 and Φ correspond to the probability density and cumulative distribution functions of a 
univariate normal, and 𝜓 and Ψ represent the probability density and cumulative distribution 
functions of the bivariate normal. For singles, this likelihood function reduces to the univariate 
case. Also, H=1 if the husband is working and W=1 if the wife is working (0 otherwise), 𝜎! 
(i=1,2) represents the standard deviations of 𝑒!, 𝑒!  and 𝜌 is the correlation between the 
stochastic errors. 
                                                
7 For purposes of identification, the Heckman selection equation uses non-labor income, number 
of children in the household, and spouse education (for married households) as exclusion 
restriction variables. 
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 Obtaining reasonable estimates of labor supply elasticities is essential in order to obtain 
believable estimates of the change in utility through the simulation exercise described below. 
Issues, well known to the literature, related to the estimation of labor supply elasticities and the 
implications of those issues to the problem at hand are addressed in detail in Appendix A.  
 With the expectation of heterogeneity in preferences across families, particularly of 
different income levels, we estimate different sets of parameters for families based on husband 
education level for married couples, and head of the household education for single families. In 
addition, we estimate different sets of parameters for male and female singles. In other words, we 
estimate five sets of parameters for married families (full sample; and husband's education is less 
than high school, high school, some college, and college plus) and 10 sets of parameters for 
singles (full sample for men and women separately; then for each education level separately for 
men and women).8 
 2.3 Expected Welfare Loss from a Shock to Aggregate Unemployment 
 We simulate a rise in the unemployment rate through an exogenous shock to the 
stochastic errors in equation (7). If, for example, an employed husband loses his job, then 𝑒! = −ℎ!∗. This also implies that the estimated welfare impact of unemployment is, by 
construction, zero if neither of the spouses is working.  
 The probability of each family member being hit by unemployment (or, rather, non-
employment, or losing a job) is a function of his or her demographic characteristics (gender, 
race, age, and education). 9 If the marginal effect on the probability that the husband becomes 
non-employed when the aggregate unemployment rate rises by one-percentage point is 𝑝! and 
                                                
8 There are many other dimensions across which utility function parameters could vary. We 
expect that differences across marital status and education/income would be most pronounced. 
9 Note that our model does not distinguish between unemployment and out of the labor force -- 
there is only employment and non-employment. 
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the marginal effect on the wife's probability becoming non-employed is 𝑝!, then the expected 
change (loss) in family welfare (𝑑𝑉 from equation 3) due to a positive probability of non-
employment is given by:  𝐸𝑥𝑝 𝑑𝑉 !!!!,!!!! = (1− 𝑝!)(1− 𝑝!)𝑑𝑉 𝑑ℎ!∗ = 0,𝑑ℎ!∗ = 0,𝑑𝐶∗ = 0  
         +  𝑝!(1− 𝑝!)𝑑𝑉 𝑑ℎ!∗ = −ℎ!∗ ,𝑑ℎ!∗ = 0,𝑑𝐶∗ = −𝑤!ℎ!∗ + 𝜏!𝑤𝑏𝑎!  
         +  (1− 𝑝!)𝑝!𝑑𝑉 𝑑ℎ!∗ = 0,𝑑ℎ!∗ = −ℎ!∗ ,𝑑𝐶∗ = −𝑤!ℎ!∗ + 𝜏!𝑤𝑏𝑎!  
         +  𝑝!𝑝!𝑑𝑉 𝑑ℎ!∗ = −ℎ!∗ ,𝑑ℎ!∗ = −ℎ!∗ ,𝑑𝐶∗ = −𝑤!ℎ!∗ − 𝑤!ℎ!∗ + 𝜏!𝑤𝑏𝑎! + 𝜏!𝑤𝑏𝑎!  . (9) 
 The first term on the right hand side of equation (9) is the expected change in utility if 
neither the husband nor the wife loses their jobs. The second term is the expected change in 
utility from only the husband losing his job. The third term is the expected change in utility from 
only the wife only losing her job. And the last term in this expression is the expected change in 
utility of both losing their jobs. For singles, this expected utility reduces to just two terms 
corresponding to the increased probability that the individual becomes non-employed and one 
minus that probability. 
 We assume that the change in aggregate unemployment is strictly an exogenous shock 
and does not play a role in the optimal hours decision of the family members. And, except for 
being related through characteristics a husband and wife have in common (such as age, race, 
state of residence, etc.), the marginal effects of non-employment for husband and wife, in 
married-couple households, are otherwise independent of each other. 10 
 When a family member loses his/her job, the family loses his and/or her earnings, but that 
earnings loss may be offset somewhat by receipt of Unemployment Insurance. Details of how we 
estimate the weekly benefit allowance (wba), eligibility, and expected take-up rate (𝜏) are 
                                                
10 Additionally, market wages are assumed to be sticky (e.g., see Kahn 1997), and, hence, are 
assumed to not be a function of unemployment in this static framework. 
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provided in Appendix C. The fact that take-up rates are below 100 percent reflects the choice of 
some individuals who lose their jobs to exit the labor force, rather than remain unemployed. The 
family may also be able to offset earnings loss through previous savings. However, given that 63 
percent of Americans say that they do not have enough savings to face an unexpected expense of 
$500 to $1,000 (Picchi 2016; also see Trubey 2016), the absence of savings from our model is 
not likely to bias our estimates of the expected loss in consumption. 
 The increases in the probabilities of non-employment are determined as follows.11 Each 
person is assigned to one of 64 specific demographic groups (based on two gender, two race, 
four age, and four education classifications). The impact of a rise in the state/year aggregate 
unemployment rate on the probability of non-employment for a member of that group is 
determined by 64 time-series probit estimations using observations from the March supplement 
of the Current Population Survey from the time period 2003-2013 with year and state fixed-
effects. For example, the smallest marginal effect of a one-percentage point increase in the 
aggregate unemployment rate was estimated to be a 0.056 percentage point decline in 
employment for white women, between 35 and 44 years old, with at least a college degree. 
Therefore, 𝑝! for a woman with these characteristics is set equal to 0.00056. The largest impact 
was estimated to be a 2.4 percentage point employment decline for white men, between the ages 
of 18 and 34, with less than a high school degree. Therefore, 𝑝! for a man with this set of 
characteristics is set equal to 0.024.12 Given a set of estimated utility function parameters, and 
estimated probabilities of non-employment, then, the family-specific impact on expected utility 
of a one-percentage point rise in the unemployment rate is given by equation (9). 
                                                
11 This procedure is similar to that employed by Gramlich (1974) in his assessment of the 
distributional consequences of unemployment. 
12 The full spectrum of non-employment marginal effects across the 64 demographic groups is 
available upon request. 
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 The model does not explicitly depend on the labor market environment (i.e., what the 
prevailing aggregate unemployment rate is) at the time of optimization. The model specification 
assumes that whatever non-employment exists is optimal (or, within a random error term of 
optimal). This means that if some of the observed non-employment is technically unemployment, 
it’s by choice – the person’s market/offered wage is less than his/her reservation wage. This 
optimization can be thought of as taking place in the aggregate at the natural rate of 
unemployment. We estimate utility function parameters using data from 2015-2016, a period of 
time which most sources consider the economy to be at or near the natural rate of unemployment 
(for example, see Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 2017). Therefore, this time period 
provides an environment in which we can interpret observed non-employment behavior as near 
optimal. 
3 Data 
 The Current Population Survey (CPS) is administered by the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics each month to roughly 60,000 households. The survey has a limited longitudinal aspect 
in that households are interviewed for four consecutive months, not interviewed for eight 
months, then interviewed again for four months. Households, families, and individuals can be 
matched across these survey months if they remain in the same physical location. In survey 
months four and eight, the household is said to be in the "outgoing rotation" group and members 
of the household are asked more detailed questions about their labor market experience, such as 
wages and hours of work.  
 We make use of the CPS outgoing rotation groups in March, April, May, and June from 
2015 and 2016 in order to construct the samples for which the family labor supply model is 
estimated. We combine as many months as possible across two years in order to construct a data 
  
- 14 - 
set as large as possible to meet the demands of the challenging estimation problem. Detailed non-
labor income is obtained by matching each family to their March supplement survey, which is 
the month in which this information is collected. Households that couldn’t be matched to the 
March data are excluded from the analysis.  
 We restrict the sample further for two reasons. The first is for structural reasons to make 
the observations conform better to the theoretical model. These restrictions involve including 
only households with members between 18-64 years of age and excluding households with 
unmarried same- or opposite sex adults/partners or children older than 18 years old. It is unclear 
in these households how to assign the "husband" and "wife" labels and potential additional adult 
labor supply is not accounted for in the model. We also exclude households in which the main 
activity of both members is being a student, being retired, or self-employment. We expect that 
those younger than 18, older than 64, students and retired individuals have additional constraints 
on their optimization problem not considered here. In addition, it is difficult to estimate market 
hourly earnings (wage) for someone who is self-employed. Given the nature of their activities, in 
a short period of time, reported earnings can be negative, even if, in the long term, the market 
value of a self-employed worker's time would be positive.  
 Because the simultaneous estimation of nonlinear labor supply functions is challenging, 
we also "trim" the data in various ways to eliminate outliers that cause difficulties in the 
estimation process. Less than five percent of the sample is eliminated based on the following 
restrictions: non-positive after-tax weekly household income, negative non-labor income, after-
tax hourly wages greater than $600 or less than $0.50, or an estimated marginal tax rate 75 
percent or higher or lower than -60 percent.  
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 Information on the detailed sources of non-labor income, number of children, and 
earnings available from the CPS is used to calculate the marginal tax rate on earnings (wages) 
and the total tax liability (in any year of interest) using the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) TAXSIM tax calculator.13 The calculator is more complete than we have 
information for from the CPS, so we made assumptions for the missing values as recommended 
by the managers of the tax calculator. For example, there is no information in the CPS that would 
allow one to calculate itemized deductions (mortgage payments, charitable contributions, etc.), 
so values of zero are entered for the missing information. This will likely over-estimate taxes 
paid for higher income individuals, since they would likely receive a higher deduction through 
itemization, although it's unlikely to affect estimated tax rates.  
 Tables 1 and 2 contain the means for the full sample and for each sub-sample based on 
education, for married and single families (respectively). We have a total of 20,163 married 
families and 15,485 single families in our sample. Among married families, about 88 percent of 
husbands and nearly 70 percent of wives are working (with both percentages increasing in 
husband's education). Husbands work more hours (43) and earn a higher after-tax hourly wage 
($21.33 after tax) than their wives, who work about 37 hours and earn $16.16 after tax. Husbands 
are slightly older than wives, at 45 vs. 43 years of age. Wives are slightly more educated than 
their husbands. The families have roughly $347 per week in (virtual) non-labor income. Virtual 
non-labor income is what the non-labor income for the family would be if the portion of the non-
linear constraint they are on were extended to the vertical axis. The average federal (state) 
                                                
13 http:// www.nber.org/~ taxsim/; see also Feenberg and Coutts (1993). In addition to the 
detained income source information from the CPS data, we also include information on property 
tax, CPS imputed capital gains and capital losses. All households are classified as if they were 
declaring taxes jointly and the main earner is identified as that with the highest total earned 
income. The tax simulation was implemented using the Stata taxsim interface. Data was prepared 
based on the recommendations found at http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/to-taxsim/cps/.  
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marginal tax rate across families is 20 percent (4 percent). 
 [Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 Women comprise 56 percent of the single persons sample. On average, women have 
slightly more education; are slightly younger than the men; work fewer hours (39 vs. 42 for 
single men); have about the same non-labor (virtual) income; have a greater number of children; 
and earn lower wages. The majority of singles have never been married (46 percent of women 
and 54 percent of men), followed by singles who are divorced.  
4 Results 
 4.1 Utility Function Parameter Estimates and Labor Supply Elasticities 
 Maximum likelihood estimates of the utility function parameters for both married and 
single families are presented in Appendix D. Average elasticity estimates for married and single 
families, along with estimates of marginal utilities, are found in Table 3. For purposes of placing 
the estimated elasticities in context of the literature, Figure 1 illustrates the intensive margin 
elasticities along with others' estimates of these elasticities. Note that own wage elasticities are 
averaged across workers and non-workers. The bottom line is that our elasticity estimates 
generally fall within the range of those found in the literature. 
[Table 3 and Figure 1 about here] 
 Note that married women's own wage elasticities are higher than married men's 
elasticities, indicating that women's labor supply is more responsive to changes in their own 
wages. In addition, married women are more responsive to changes in their own wages than are 
single women, who average an own-wage elasticity very close to that of single men. The 
estimated negative cross-wage elasticities (among married families) indicate that husbands and 
wives view their non-market time as substitutes. Cross wage elasticities for husbands and wives 
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correspond to families in which both members are working. Both men and women present the 
expected negative income elasticity. The bottom line from these estimates of labor supply 
elasticities is that the simulation will be based on behavior reflected through labor supply 
elasticities consistent with those estimated by others, using different data, empirical models, and 
for different purposes, suggesting that our estimates are in line with other's estimates.  Appendix 
E provides a sensitivity analysis showing that our results are robust to variations in labor supply 
elasticities. The results from this sensitivity analysis are discussed below. 
 4.2 Expected Welfare Loss From a Shock to Unemployment 
 By dividing the calculated expected loss in welfare from a one-percentage point rise in 
the unemployment rate (in utils) by the family's marginal utility of income/consumption (𝑈!), we 
get a dollar value of that expected welfare loss. Table 4 reports the annualized dollar value for 
the expected welfare loss from a positive shock to unemployment for families of different types 
and education levels (the loss as a share of total household income is also reported).14  
[Table 4 about here] 
 Workers at higher education levels earn higher wages, putting upward pressure on the 
expected welfare loss from non-employment. For example, the average annual income for 
families with at least a college degree is more than four times larger than families with less than 
a high school degree (i.e., roughly $88,000 vs. $34,000). Therefore, families with higher 
education (higher earnings) have much more to lose if they are hit by non-employment.  
 However, a higher education level also means a lower probability of being hit by non-
employment, putting downward pressure on the expected welfare loss from rising 
                                                
14 This is not to imply that an analogous negative shock to the unemployment rate would 
generate a symmetric gain in welfare for families. In fact, De Neve et al. (2017) find that 
subjective well-being is more sensitive to negative economic conditions than to positive 
economic conditions. 
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unemployment. For example, a one percentage point rise in the unemployment increases the 
probability of non-employment for someone with less than a college degree by 1.23 percentage 
points, whereas the marginal effect on someone with a college degree is only 0.54 percent points. 
Based on the results in Table 4, we see that, since the expected welfare loss increases with 
education, the impact of the potential of losing higher wages dominates the lower probability of 
non-employment. 
 The average annualized expected welfare loss for the whole sample is $1,156. To put this 
figure into perspective, consider that a recent survey finds that 63 percent of Americans report 
that they do not have enough savings to face an unexpected expense of $500 to $1,000 (Picchi 
2016; also see Trubey 2016). So, a loss of $1,156 would be significant for a majority of 
American families. This estimate of expected welfare loss is much lower than that found in Hurd 
(1980), who estimates an individual welfare loss per unemployment spell of about $7,000  (in 
2012 dollars). One reason Hurd's estimate is so much higher than ours is that we are estimating 
the expected welfare loss from non-employment, rather than the actual cost of a specific job loss. 
In addition, his model does not allow for any positive utility gained from additional non-market 
time that results from unemployment, nor the potential mitigating effects of unemployment 
insurance. 
 There is a significant difference between single and married families -- the average 
expected welfare loss overall is $1,944 among married families, whereas the average annualized 
expected loss is only $131 among singles. To explain this difference one might first look at the 
relative valuation that singles and married individuals place on non-market time and income (the 
marginal utilities in Table 3). If a household values non-market time more, relative to income, 
the expected loss from unemployment would be lower. However, from those tables we can see 
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that, overall, married and single families have similar non-market time/income marginal utility 
ratios. The ratio is 15.6 and 13.7 for single women and men, respectively, and among married 
households it is 18.7 for husbands' non-market time and 14.1 for wives' non-market time. 
 Another possibility is that with two people in the household, the chance of taking a "hit" 
from unemployment essentially doubles for married families. The only households that will be 
completely unaffected by a rise in the unemployment rate are those with no workers in the 
household. Among singles, this is about 20 percent of families, whereas the percent of married 
families with no workers is only four percent. However, this explanation is lacking, as well, 
since if we exclude singles who are not working from the calculation, the average annual 
expected loss from unemployment increases to only $164. This lower cost of unemployment 
varies a bit across family status among singles, as well. The average annualized loss ranges from 
$76 for widows, $139 for never married, $125 for separated, $128 for divorced, to $154 for 
households with the spouse-not-present. 
 The primary significant difference between married and single families affecting their 
average expected welfare loss from a rise in the unemployment rate appears to be the difference 
in their total income levels. On average, married families have more than twice the level of total 
income than single families (i.e., roughly $84,000 vs. $40,000). In addition, the probability of at 
least one person in a household being non-employed when the unemployment rate rises by one 
percentage point increases by more in a married household than in a single household -- by 1.8 
percentage points for a married household and by 0.95 percentage points in a single household, 
on average.15  
                                                
15 The amount by which the probability of non-employment for at least one member of a married 
household increases is calculated by one minus the increased probability of both members being 
hit by non-employment. Specifically, the average marginal effect of a one percentage point 
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 Note that concluding that the welfare loss from a one percentage point rise in the 
unemployment rate is greater for married families than for single families, and is greater for the 
more educated, does not say anything about the welfare levels of different family types or 
education levels. In addition, welfare costs of a rise in the unemployment rate discussed here do 
not take into account the potential long term consequences of job loss on the mental and physical 
health of those impacted and/or their children or on lifetime wealth.  For example, see 
Golberstein, Gonzales, and Meara (2016); Sullivan and Wachter (2009); Mathers and Schofield 
(1998); Krueger, Mitman, and Perri (2016). Nor does our estimate of the expected welfare cost 
of rising unemployment take into account any fear that families or individuals might have of 
losing their job (as DiTella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2001 claim their survey of happiness 
does).  
 4.3 Equivalent Welfare loss from an Unanticipated Price Level Change 
 In order to illustrate how we simulate the price level change needed to generate the same 
expected welfare loss of a one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate, we expand the 
change in indirect utility expressed in equation (3): 
 𝑑𝑉 = −𝑈! !!!!!! − 𝑈!    !!!!!! + 𝑈! 𝑤! !!!!!! + ℎ! + 𝑤! !!!!!!   𝑑𝑤! 
             +   −𝑈! !!!!!! − 𝑈!    !!!!!! + 𝑈! 𝑤! !!!!!! + ℎ! + 𝑤! !!!!!!   𝑑𝑤! 
             +   −𝑈! !!!!! − 𝑈!   !!!!! + 𝑈! 𝑤! !!!!! + 1+ 𝑤! !!!!!   𝑑𝑌.  (10) 
The only consumption price in our model is that of the numeraire price of consumption. 
However, we can reflect a change in prices by changing the other components that enter the 
                                                                                                                                                       
increase in the unemployment rate on the probability of non-employment for married men is 
0.0107; for married women it is 0.0073. So, the marginal effect of either one, or both, of them 
being hit is one minus the marginal effect for neither of them being hit: [1-(1-0.0107)(1-0.0073)] 
= 0.018 
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model in real dollars. Equation (10) shows how family welfare is affected by changes in wages 
and non-labor income, directly, and also through each person's labor supply elasticities. Of 
course, there are no cross-elasticities that enter the calculation in a single family's change in 
utility.  
 If prices increase by i, the value, or purchasing power, of wages and non-labor income 
declines by −[𝑖/(1+ 𝑖)]. Given that we are considering a one-time, unanticipated change in the 
level of prices, we assume that nominal wages are sticky over the same time period (e.g., see 
Kahn 1997).  
 Calculating the equivalent welfare cost from an unanticipated price level change, then, 
amounts to finding the value of i that equates equation (9) and equation (10): 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝 𝑑𝑉 !!!!,!!!! = −𝑈! !!!!!! − 𝑈!    !!!!!! + 𝑈! 𝑤! !!!!!! + ℎ! + 𝑤! !!!!!! − !!!! ∗ 𝑤!  
                                     +   −𝑈! !!!!!! − 𝑈!    !!!!!! + 𝑈! 𝑤! !!!!!! + ℎ! + 𝑤! !!!!!! − !!!! ∗ 𝑤!  
                                     +   −𝑈! !!!!! − 𝑈!   !!!!! + 𝑈! 𝑤! !!!!! + 1+ 𝑤! !!!!! − !!!! ∗ 𝑌 .  (11) 
In other words, i is the percent increase in the consumption price level that generates, for each 
family, the same expected change in utility as a one-percentage point rise in the aggregate 
unemployment rate. This one-time price level change will be able to tell us something about how 
the individual family views the trade off between a rise in unemployment and a rise in prices. 
 Table 5 presents the equivalent price level change by marital status and education. For 
the full sample, the average equivalent price level change is 1.82 percent (with a median of 0.83 
percent). Among families in which at least one member is working (the only member in single 
families), the average equivalent price level change increases to 3.1 percent for married families 
and 0.38 percent for singles. The reason the equivalent price level change is lower when there are 
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non-employed members in the household is because any rise in the unemployment rate has no 
impact on individuals who are already out of the labor force, so the expected loss from 
unemployment is less.  
[Table 5 about here] 
 The unanticipated equivalent price level change is much lower among single families at 
0.30 percent (0.21 percent at the median). Since the cost of a one-percentage point rise in the 
unemployment rate is not as costly to them, singles, if given a choice, would not willingly endure 
as large a shock to prices in order to avoid a rise in unemployment. If we interpret this valuation 
of an unanticipated shock to prices as reflective of a short-term reaction to unanticipated 
inflation, this result is consistent with Burdett et al. (2016) who find that singles are much more 
likely to hold cash than non-singles, which loses value more quickly with inflation than other 
assets; they conclude that, "...inflation is a tax on being single" (p. 352).16 While we get there 
from a very different empirical strategy, our results point to the same conclusion. In addition, 
Burdett et al. find that among the non-married, inflation is likely to be most costly to those who 
are widowed; we find the same, as illustrated in Table 5. 
 Another point of comparison for these results is the work by DiTella, MacCulloch, and 
Oswald (2001). Their analysis across countries and time finds that, "a 1-percentage-point 
increase in the unemployment rate equals the loss brought about by an extra 1.66 percentage 
points of inflation" (p. 339). Again, their analysis is quite different from the one presented here -- 
they estimate life satisfaction as a function of unemployment and inflation across many countries 
and time. And, although they do not provide the nuances seen here across demographics, their 
                                                
16 Also see Aruoba, Davis, and Wright (2016). Other research (Alm, Whittington, and Fletcher 
2002) has identified a tax on singles (relative to others with similar economic and demographic 
characteristics) through the structure of the U.S. tax system, however it is unclear how inflation 
would make that worse. 
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estimated inflation generated loss of happiness (or, welfare) equivalent to 1pp rise in the 
unemployment rate is within the range of the equivalent price level changes presented in Table 5. 
 As mentioned earlier, Appendix E contains the results from a sensitivity analysis for the 
equivalent price level changes presented in Table 5. For the full sample of married families, the 
alternate price level changes, using alternative elasticities found in the literature, range from a 
low of 2.69 to a high of 3.95 percent (around our estimate of 2.98 percent). For single men and 
women, there is no measurable difference in the estimates using alternative labor supply 
elasticities. The estimates presented here for the expected welfare cost of unemployment and its 
equivalent shock to prices are clearly not being driven by differences found between our labor 
supply elasticities and those in the rest of the literature. 
 4.4 Unanticipated Price Level Change vs. Unemployment Shock Trade-off  
 There is a rich literature that estimates the cost of inflation in terms of how much 
consumption one would be willing to give up to lower inflation, typically from 10 percent to 
some target level (see Lagos, Rocheteau, and Wright, Forthcoming). The estimates of the 
inflation/consumption trade-off range between 2 (Lagos and Wright 2005) and 1.25 (Dong 
2010). An estimate greater than one implies a greater value placed on lowering inflation than the 
resulting loss in consumption.17  
 We can make a similar trade-off assessment by comparing the equivalent welfare cost of 
an unanticipated rise in prices and the expected welfare cost of a shock to unemployment as a 
percent of total income. This requires assuming that the welfare cost of an unanticipated rise in 
prices is reflective of the short-term welfare impact of an unanticipated increase in inflation. 
                                                
17 A trade-off value greater than one is also consistent with Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010), 
who find, in a life-cycle model, that individuals value the risk of wage loss (productivity) more 
than the risk of employment loss (job destruction). 
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Figure 2 plots these losses along with the ratio of the two reflecting their trade-off.18  A ratio 
greater than one implies a greater loss from an unanticipated rise in prices than an equivalent 
welfare shock from a one percentage-point rise in the unemployment rate. 
 [Figure 2 about here] 
 Panel (a) of Figure 2 illustrates, for all families combined, that the cost of a one 
percentage-point equivalent rise in prices increases with income in the lower half of the income 
distribution, then basically flattens out. The expected loss from an increase in unemployment, as 
a percent of income (panel b), also rises in the lower half of the income distribution, but then 
declines as income continues to rise. This declining welfare loss from unemployment is more 
dramatic among married families (see Appendix F) and is consistent with Krueger, Mitman, and 
Perri (2016) who find that the loss to lifetime consumption from higher unemployment during 
recessions represents a lower share of income in wealthier households.  
 Panel (c) shows the ratio of the welfare loss from a price level change relative to the 
welfare loss from a shock to unemployment. This ratio is less than one for the bottom half of the 
distribution, indicating that for lower-income families, the welfare loss from rising prices is less 
than the expected welfare loss from a rise in unemployment (as a share of total income). In the 
upper half of the income distribution, the welfare loss from a shock to prices exceeds the 
expected welfare loss from a shock to unemployment. This comparison is made separately for 
married and single families in Appendix F. In spite of the dramatically different annualized 
dollar amount of expected loss from a one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate, and 
hence tolerance for unanticipated price level changes, the price shock/unemployment shock 
welfare loss trade-off produces similar results across family types. As a percent of total income, 
                                                
18 Differences between married and single families can be seen in Appendix F. 
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a shock to unemployment is worse than an equivalent price level change for those below the 
median income level and vice verse for those above the median.  
5 Conclusions and Implications 
 Awareness of the personal or family welfare cost of a shock to unemployment and how 
that cost varies across families is of interest due to the distributional implications of policy that 
might affect the labor market. We find, on average, that the expected loss to family welfare of a 
one-percentage point rise in the aggregate unemployment rate is equivalent to an annualized 
dollar amount of $1,156. We also find a considerable amount of heterogeneity across families, 
which means that aggregate averages yield very different answers than looking more closely at 
population sub-groups. For example, the expected welfare cost of a shock to unemployment is 
much higher among married (vs. single) families and increases for both in education/income 
levels.  
We also find that an unanticipated increase in prices of about 1.8%, on average for all 
families, produces a welfare loss equivalent to that generated by a one percentage point shock to 
unemployment and is much lower for single families than for married families. If reflective of a 
short-term reaction to inflation, then this result is consistent with Burdett et al.'s (2016) finding 
that inflation places a larger tax on singles. On average singles would only be willing to trade an 
increase in prices of roughly one-third of a percent to avoid a one percentage point rise in the 
unemployment rate, whereas married families would tolerate a price level increase of up to three 
percent to avoid the same degree of unemployment rate shock.  
Additionally, we find that the welfare loss from a rise in prices vs. a shock to 
unemployment as a share of total income increases with income, suggesting that those in the 
lower end of the income distribution experience a greater welfare loss as a percent of total 
  
- 26 - 
income from a shock to unemployment relative to an unanticipated price level increase, but vice 
versa for those in the upper end of the income distribution. This conclusion holds for both 
married and single families, suggesting that, regardless of family structure and overall dollar 
equivalent value of the expected loss from a rise in the unemployment rate, the welfare trade-off 
between unemployment and an unanticipated rise in prices varies consistently across the income 
distribution.
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Table 1 Sample means for married families, combined 2015-16 CPS observations. 
 
Full 
Sample 
Husband 
Less 
Than 
High 
School 
Husband 
High 
School 
Husband 
Some 
College 
Husband 
College 
and 
Above 
Number of Married Families 20,163 1,502 5,401 5,233 8,027 
Husband Average Characteristics           
Husband working = 1 88.10% 76.70% 84.50% 86.60% 93.60% 
Husband gross wage (w1), incl. imputed $28.90 $16.26 $21.94 $25.16 $38.38 
Husband after-tax wage $21.33 $13.45 $17.15 $18.99 $27.13 
Husband hours (h1), if working 42.9 41.1 42.2 42.7 43.8 
Husband age 44.5 44.2 45.2 44.8 43.8 
Husband Non White = 1 25.5% 57.5% 26.3% 22.2% 21.1% 
Husband Less than High School = 1 7.4%     
Husband High School = 1 26.8%     
Husband Some College = 1 26.0%     
Husband College and Above = 1 39.8%     
 
Wife Average Characteristics      
   Wife working = 1 69.70% 49.10% 68.10% 72.90% 72.60% 
   Wife wage (w2), incl. imputed $21.98 $11.08 $17.46 $21.09 $27.63 
   Wife after-tax wage $16.16 $9.06 $13.53 $15.85 $19.46 
   Wife hours (h2), if working 37.2 36.2 37.3 37.2 37.2 
   Wife age 42.6 41.8 43.2 43.0 42.0 
Wife Non White = 1 26.0% 56.3% 26.4% 22.0% 22.5% 
Wife Less than High School = 1 6.0% 46.7% 6.0% 2.6% 0.5% 
Wife High School = 1 23.0% 29.1% 49.0% 19.5% 6.6% 
Wife Some College = 1 27.4% 18.4% 27.8% 46.1% 16.5% 
Wife College and Above = 1 43.7% 5.8% 17.2% 31.8% 76.4% 
 
Family Average Characteristics      
   Weekly net non-labor (virtual) income (Y) 347.13 248.12 291.53 344.15 405.01 
   Number of children less 0-5 0.38 0.41 0.31 0.34 0.44 
   Number of children less 6-12 0.46 0.61 0.44 0.42 0.47 
   Number of children less 13-18 0.31 0.40 0.31 0.30 0.30 
   Federal marginal tax rate 19.55 12.35 16.54 18.84 23.38 
   State marginal tax rate 4.27 2.98 3.99 4.33 4.65 
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Table 2 Sample means for single families, combined 2015-16 CPS observations. 
 Full 
Sample 
Less 
Than 
High 
School 
High 
School 
Some 
College 
College 
and 
Above 
Number of Single Men 6,877 644 2,138 1,998 2,097 
Working = 1 81.60% 56.10% 76.30% 83.20% 93.30% 
Gross wage (w1), incl. imputed $22.73 $10.70 $17.20 $21.42 $33.29 
After-tax wage $17.41 $9.10 $13.84 $16.62 $24.34 
Hours (h1), if working 41.7 40.0 41.0 41.3 43.1 
Age 44.7 48.1 45.2 45.1 42.8 
Non White = 1 29.8% 48.6% 30.7% 27.0% 25.6% 
Less than High School = 1 9.4%         
High School = 1 31.1%         
Some College = 1 29.1%         
College and Above = 1 30.5%         
Single Status      
   married, spouse absent 3.8% 3.9% 3.2% 2.7% 5.3% 
   separated 6.0% 11.3% 6.7% 5.8% 4.0% 
   divorced 33.8% 34.0% 34.9% 40.1% 26.6% 
   widowed 2.9% 5.4% 3.3% 2.6% 2.0% 
   never married 53.5% 45.3% 51.9% 48.8% 62.2% 
Weekly net non-labor (virtual) income (Y) $195.51  $152.56  $170.68  $195.04  $234.46  
Number of children less 0-5 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Number of children less 6-12 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
Number of children less 13-18 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Federal marginal tax rate 14.80 4.76 11.74 15.07 20.76 
State marginal tax rate 3.51 1.87 3.12 3.63 4.30 
      
Number of Single Women 8,608 763 2,061 2,810 2,974 
Working = 1 78.50% 47.70% 67.80% 79.40% 92.90% 
Gross wage (w1), incl. imputed $19.92 $8.62 $12.68 $18.04 $29.63 
After-tax wage $15.90 $8.24 $11.11 $14.92 $22.11 
Hours (h1), if working 38.8 35.3 36.8 38.3 40.7 
Age 44.5 45.7 44.5 45.1 43.7 
Non White = 1 36.5% 59.4% 43.9% 35.2% 26.7% 
Less than High School = 1 8.9%         
High School = 1 23.9%         
Some College = 1 32.6%         
  
- 34 - 
 Full 
Sample 
Less 
Than 
High 
School 
High 
School 
Some 
College 
College 
and 
Above 
College and Above = 1 34.5%         
Single Status      
   married, spouse absent 3.5% 4.2% 4.0% 2.8% 3.6% 
   separated 6.8% 12.7% 8.1% 6.8% 4.4% 
   divorced 36.9% 26.6% 34.9% 43.1% 35.1% 
   widowed 7.1% 11.4% 9.1% 6.9% 4.8% 
   never married 45.7% 45.1% 44.0% 40.4% 52.0% 
Weekly net non-labor (virtual) income (Y) $196.36  $169.91  $173.13  $185.53  $229.49  
Number of children less 0-5 0.13 0.23 0.20 0.13 0.07 
Number of children less 6-12 0.24 0.32 0.26 0.28 0.16 
Number of children less 13-18 0.21 0.28 0.23 0.24 0.16 
Federal marginal tax rate 10.08 -4.72 3.43 9.85 18.71 
   single women with children 4.04 -12.51 -2.94 5.68 16.29 
   single women without children 12.95 0.19 7.16 12.21 19.46 
State marginal tax rate 2.99 0.57 2.10 3.07 4.14 
   single women with children 2.46 0.30 1.54 2.70 4.02 
   single women without children 3.24 0.74 2.43 3.28 4.18 
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Table 3 Estimated elasticities and marginal utilities, married and single families. 
  
Full 
Sample 
Husband 
(or single 
head) 
Less 
Than 
High 
School 
Husband 
(or single 
head) 
High 
School 
Husband 
(or single 
head) 
Some 
College 
Husband 
(or single 
head) 
College 
and 
Above 
Husband Elasticities           
Own wage elasticity 0.052 0.142 0.093 0.096 -0.003 
Cross wage elasticity -0.066 -0.081 -0.054 -0.055 -0.063 
Income elasticity -0.027 -0.034 -0.034 -0.023 -0.025 
Participation own wage elasticity 0.009 0.071 0.023 0.018 0.000 
Participation cross wage elasticity -0.010 -0.045 -0.014 -0.011 -0.003 
Participation income elasticity -0.005 -0.017 -0.010 -0.005 -0.001 
      
Wife Elasticities      
Own wage elasticity 0.280 0.675 0.294 0.243 0.259 
Cross wage elasticity -0.102 -0.168 -0.081 -0.080 -0.106 
Income elasticity -0.029 -0.064 -0.033 -0.026 -0.027 
Participation own wage elasticity 0.192 1.065 0.216 0.140 0.159 
Participation cross wage elasticity -0.068 -0.239 -0.057 -0.046 -0.065 
Participation income elasticity -0.019 -0.090 -0.025 -0.014 -0.017 
      
Married Families Marginal Utilities           
MU wrt husband's non-market time 5.61 11.20 8.51 7.02 2.93 
MU wrt wife's non-market time 4.23 7.71 6.62 5.71 2.08 
MU wrt income 0.30 0.93 0.53 0.41 0.12 
            
Single Men Elasticities and MUs           
Own wage elasticity 0.217 0.924 0.393 0.182 -0.046 
Income elasticity -0.072 -0.136 -0.062 -0.067 -0.023 
Participation own wage elasticity 0.032 0.518 0.098 0.025 -0.002 
Participation income elasticity -0.010 -0.049 -0.013 -0.009 -0.001 
MU wrt non-market time 132.51 355.51 115.97 137.78 4.30 
MU wrt income 8.50 49.13 9.05 8.65 0.19 
      
Single Women Elasticities and MUs           
Own wage elasticity 0.225 0.634 0.492 0.130 -0.015 
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Full 
Sample 
Husband 
(or single 
head) 
Less 
Than 
High 
School 
Husband 
(or single 
head) 
High 
School 
Husband 
(or single 
head) 
Some 
College 
Husband 
(or single 
head) 
College 
and 
Above 
Income elasticity -0.070 -0.050 -0.062 -0.058 -0.034 
Participation own wage elasticity 0.051 0.767 0.199 0.036 0.000 
Participation income elasticity -0.014 -0.031 -0.021 -0.015 -0.001 
MU wrt non-market time 67.57 55.48 81.42 45.15 8.91 
MU wrt income 4.95 8.68 8.10 3.23 0.44 
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Table 4 Average welfare cost of a negative shock to employment by family type and education, 
share of total annual income in brackets.  
 
Include families 
with non-employed 
members 
Families with at 
least one employed 
member 
All families $1,156 [1.74%] 
$1,298 
[1.95%] 
Less than high school $454 [0.69%] 
$639 
[1.36%] 
High school $898 [1.50%] 
$1, 61 
[1.77%] 
Some college $1,019 [1.55%] 
$1,145 
[1.74%] 
College or more $2,223 [2.81%] 
$2,305 
[2.92%] 
Married families $1,944 [2.85%] 
$2,021 
[2.96%] 
Single families $131 [0.29%] 
$164 
[0.36%] 
   married, spouse-not-present $153 [0.32%] 
$183 
[0.38%] 
   separated $125 [0.31%] 
$168 
[0.42%] 
   divorced $128 [0.26%] 
$163 
[0.33] 
   widowed $75 [0.16%] 
$116 
[0.24%] 
   never married $139 [0.32%] 
$168 
[0.39] 
   
Note: Education refers to single head of household or husband education for married families. 
Full sample estimates are used to report results for the full sample and the education specific 
estimates are used to report results by education group. 
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Table 5 Average equivalent price level change estimated by family type and education.  
 
Include families 
with non-employed 
members 
Families with at 
least one employed 
member 
All families 1.82% 2.04% 
Less than high school 1.13% 1.60% 
High school 1.53% 1.81% 
Some college 1.64% 1.84% 
College or more 2.85% 2.95% 
Married families 2.98% 3.10% 
Single families 0.30% 0.38% 
   married, spouse-not-present 0.34% 0.41% 
   separated 0.30% 0.40% 
   divorced 0.28% 0.35% 
   widowed 0.18% 0.27% 
   never married 0.33% 0.40% 
Note: Education refers to single head of household or husband education for married families. 
Full sample estimates are used to report results for the full sample and the education specific 
estimates are used to report results by education group. 
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Figure 1 Comparison of intensive margin elasticity estimates with the literature. 
(a) Husband's (men's) elasticities 
    
 
(b) Wife's (women's) elasticities 
   
 Notes: Sources of literature estimates are Devereux (2004); Hotchkiss, Moore, and Rios-Avila (2012); Hotchkiss, Kassis, and Moore (1997); Heim 
(2009); Blau and Kahn (2007); Triest (1990); Pencavel (2002); Ransom (1987); Blundell and Macurdy (1999); Kumar (2009); Bishop, Heim, and 
Mihaly (2009); Imai and Keane (2004); and Chetty (2012). Also see Keane (2011) and McClelland and Mok (2012) Many fewer sources provide 
estimates for participation elasticities, but ours fall within the literature bounds (available upon request). 
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Figure 2 Comparing welfare losses from a price shock vs. an unemployment shock across the income distribution, full sample averages. 
 
(a) Welfare loss from equivalent price level 
change 
 
 
 
(b) Welfare loss from 1pp increase in the 
aggregate unemployment rate (% of total 
income) 
   
(c) Ratio of welfare loss from a price level 
change vs. welfare loss from unemployment 
shock 
 
 
Note: Percent of the sample noted by dashed lines at maximum household income for those in the bottom 20%, the sample median, and the min household income 
for those in the top 20%. Comparable 2015 median household incomes reported for the U.S. by the Census Bureau can be found here: https://goo.gl/XkzVMR. 
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Appendix A: Estimation Issues -- obtaining reasonable labor supply elasticities 
 The simulations detailed in Section 2 are only possible to the extent to which we are able 
to obtain realistic estimates of labor supply elasticities through which the change in family 
welfare is calculated. This appendix discusses a number of issues well-known to the literature 
related to the estimation of those labor supply elasticities and the implications of those issues to 
the problem at hand. Many of the caveats, warnings, solutions, and implications related to this 
specific model were first detailed in Hotchkiss et al (2012). 
 First of all, the stochastic errors accounted for in equation (7) represent errors in 
optimization -- observed hours do not exactly reflect desired hours. Keane (2011) points out that 
there may exist measurement error in observed wages and non-labor income. This classical 
measurement error may bias elasticity estimates toward zero. Heim (2009), using a methodology 
most similar to the one used here, presents results showing that accounting for measurement 
error produces elasticities practically identical to when it is not accounted for. A typical strategy 
to mitigate the introduction of measurement error on wages per hour has been to restrict the 
sample to hourly paid workers. Unfortunately, restricting the sample to hourly workers reduces 
the sample size too much. Instead, we construct the person's hourly wage using information 
about weekly earnings and usual weekly hours. This means our wage estimate might suffer from 
what Keane refers to as "denominator bias," which will have the tendency of biasing labor 
supply elasticities downward. 
 Keane (2011) also identifies two potential sources of endogeneity. First, it is reasonable 
to expect that observed wages and non-labor income are correlated with a person's taste for work 
(reflected through hours of work). Both fixed effects and instrumental variables have been used 
to resolve this issue, but are simply not possible in this case since we do not have panel data and 
because of the highly non-linear nature of the labor supply functions. In addition to the inclusion 
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of variables expected to affect the taste for work (e.g., children), we expect that the inclusion of 
spousal variables (through the estimation of joint labor supply) will help to remove additional 
sources of correlation from the error term (i.e., because of positive assortative mating, people 
with similar taste for work will be married to each other; see Lam 1988 and Herrnstein and 
Murray 1994). In addition, we abstract from the progressivity of the tax structure by using net 
wages and "linearizing" the budget constraint (see Hall 1973), which is valid if preferences are 
strictly convex. This means that family members would make the same hours choice facing this 
linearized budget constraint that they would have made facing the nonlinear budget constraint. 
This assumption of strictly convex preferences can be tested by analyzing the second order 
conditions of the maximization problem, which are akin to the internal consistency conditions 
established by (Amemiya 1974, 1006). Using the nomenclature presented in equations 5 and 6, 
the conditions imply that Ω! < 0;  Ω! < 0 and Ω!Ω! > Ω! ∗ Ω!, which are found to be true for 
all the models estimated here. If this assumption is binding, Keane points out that labor supply 
elasticities will be biased in a negative direction. Aaronson and French (2009) illustrate only a 
very slight downward bias when progressivity of the tax system is not taken into account. 
 An additional concern Keane (2011) identifies in the literature is making sure the 
hours/wage combinations observed in the data are coming off workers' labor supply curve, rather 
than off employers' labor demand curve. Identification of the labor supply relationship boils 
down to including regressors (determinants of hours) that reflect the demand for a person's skills 
(thus determine the observed wage) that are not reflective of that person's taste for work. Toward 
that end, we include an indicator for race that could affect observed wage through employer 
discrimination, but, ceteris paribus (e.g., controlling for education), should not affect taste for 
work. 
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 Further, the issue of the presence of fixed costs of working is raised by Apps and Rees 
(2009). We only marginally control for fixed costs by including the presence of children in the 
determination of hours. However, Heim (2009) presents results showing that once demographics 
are controlled for, additional consideration of fixed costs only very slightly impacts estimates of 
the parameters of the utility function (Heim, Table 3). 
 As is seen in Section 4, the simplifications that we've made because of the complexity of 
the model do not harm our goal of obtaining reasonable labor supply elasticities with which to 
perform the simulations in this paper. 
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Appendix B: First order conditions of utility maximization problem and labor supply 
equations. 
 
 The quadratic functional form as presented in equation (4) in the text can also be written 
in the following form: 
𝑈 𝑍 = 𝑎! 𝐿! + 𝑎! 𝐿! + 𝑎! 𝐶 − !! 𝑏!! 𝐿! ! − !! 𝑏!! 𝐿! ! − !! 𝑏!! 𝐶 ! − 𝑏!"𝐿!𝐿! − 𝑏!"𝐿!𝐶 − 𝑏!"𝐿!𝐶 (A1) 
Where 𝐿! = 𝑇 − ℎ!; 𝐿! = 𝑇 − ℎ!;𝑎𝑛𝑑,𝐶 = 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌 
This becomes an unconstrained utility maximization problem which depends on the working 
hours ℎ! and ℎ!, assuming that Y (non-labor income) is exogenous. The corresponding first order 
conditions become: 
!"!!! = 𝑎!∗ + 𝑎!∗𝑤! − 𝑏!!ℎ! − 𝑏!!𝑤! 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌 − 𝑏!"ℎ! + 𝑏!" 2𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌 + 𝑏!"𝑤!ℎ! = 0 (A2) 
!"!!! = 𝑎!∗ + 𝑎!∗𝑤! − 𝑏!!ℎ! − 𝑏!!𝑤! 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌 − 𝑏!"ℎ! + 𝑏!" 𝑤!ℎ! + 2𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌 + 𝑏!"𝑤!ℎ! = 0 (A3) 
There is no need to specify a time endowment (T) in order to estimate the labor supply functions 
because 𝑎!∗, 𝑎!∗ , and 𝑎!∗  are re-parameterized functions of T and Y. This re-parameterization is 
necessary for identification of the labor supply equations. It is through these starred parameters 
that differences in tastes across families are allowed to enter. Specifically, 𝑎!∗ = 𝑋!Γ!  and 𝑎!∗ = 𝑋!Γ! 
where 𝑋! and 𝑋! are vectors of individual and family characteristics and Γ! and Γ! are parameters 
to be estimated. 
 Using equations (A2) and (A3), we can solve the system obtaining the values of ℎ! and ℎ! that maximize the utility function, in the following way: Ω!ℎ!∗ + Ω!ℎ!∗ + Ω! = 0 (A4) Ω!ℎ!∗ + Ω!ℎ!∗ + Ω! = 0,   where, (A5) Ω! = 2𝑏!"𝑤! − 𝑏!! − 𝑏!!𝑤!!; (A6) 
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Ω! = 𝑏!"𝑤! + 𝑏!!𝑤!𝑤! − 𝑏!" + 𝑏!"𝑤!; (A7) Ω! = 𝑎∗! + 𝑎∗!𝑤! + 𝑏!!𝑤! + 𝑏!" 𝑌; (A8) Ω! = 2𝑏!"𝑤! − 𝑏!! − 𝑏!!𝑤!!;   and (A9) Ω! = 𝑎∗! + 𝑎∗!𝑤! + 𝑏!!𝑤! + 𝑏!" 𝑌. (A10) 
From equations (A4) and (A5), the solutions for ℎ!∗ and ℎ!∗  become: ℎ!∗ = !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!     and   ℎ!∗ = !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!   . (A11) 
These derivatives are obtained with the help of Mathematica® (version 8 2010). We calculate 
expected hours conditional on being positive according to Muthen (1990). 
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Appendix C: Unemployment Insurance eligibility, take-up, and benefit amounts. 
 Expected weekly benefit allowance from UI is simulated using published eligibility and 
benefit rules published by the Employment and Training Administration 
(http://www.unemploymentinsurance.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp#Statelaw). See Chetty 
2008), Cullen and Gruber (2000), and Edwards (2015) for other applications of this simulation 
procedure. The simulation requires us to know details of the recipient's earnings history that are 
not available from the cross-section used for analysis here. Consequently, we assume that current 
weekly earnings reflect the earnings history for the person losing their job and use that amount to 
estimate base period and quarterly earnings used to calculate benefits and eligibility. It's not clear 
whether using current earnings will over- or under-estimate eligibility and benefits. 
 It is well known that only a fraction of those eligible for UI actually "take-up" the benefit 
(Blank and Card 1991; Currie 2006). Take-up rates are estimated to be anywhere between 40-55 
percent (Anderson and Meyer 1997) and 80 percent (Ebenstein and Stange 2010, using aggregate 
state level data), and varies over time (Michaelides and Mueser 2012) and across the business 
cycle (Fuller, Ravikumar, and Zhang 2012; Kettemann 2014). Take-up rates have also been 
shown to vary by demographics (Michaelides and Mueser 2012) and by benefit amount, tax 
rates, and expected duration (Anderson and Meyer 1997). We make use of the take-up rate of 55 
percent estimated by Anderson and Meyer since it is estimated based on individual level data and 
we also vary the take-up rate based on their estimated benefit amount (WBA) elasticity of 
0.0225. Along the distribution of estimated WBAs (separately for men and women), we set the 
take-up rate at 0.55 for the median WBA (𝑊𝐵𝐴!), then use the following formula for eligible 
recipient i as his/her simulated 𝑊𝐵𝐴! differs from the median value: 𝜏! = 0.55 + 0.0225 ∗ !"#!!!"#!!"#!  . 𝜏! is restricted to fall between zero and one.
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Appendix D: Maximum likelihood estimation results. 
 
Table D.1 Maximum likelihood parameter estimates for married families.  
  Full Sample 
Husband 
Less Than 
High School 
Husband 
High School 
Husband 
Some 
College 
Husband 
College or 
More 
a1: Husband      
 Age  2.122* 2.013* 1.991* 2.675* 2.033* 
  (0.120) (0.550) (0.251) (0.245) (0.178) 
Age^2 -0.0278* -0.0290* -0.0277* -0.0341* -0.0255* 
  (0.00135) (0.00629) (0.00284) (0.00275) (0.00199) 
Black -2.356* 3.015+ -3.472* -3.977* -1.785* 
  (0.332) (1.428) (0.726) (0.710) (0.445) 
Education (excluded=Less than High School) 
High School 5.245*    
   (0.574)    
 Some College 7.107*    
   (0.586)    
 College 11.89*    
   (0.605)    
 nkids 0-5 -0.169 1.980^ -0.296 0.0281 -0.535^ 
  (0.243) (1.098) (0.588) (0.516) (0.303) 
nkids 6-12 0.0112 1.310 -0.0943 -0.453 -0.312 
  (0.202) (0.853) (0.450) (0.428) (0.270) 
nkids 13-18 1.041* 2.257+ 0.626 0.381 0.924* 
  (0.243) (1.025) (0.532) (0.514) (0.325) 
Constant -7.440* -13.04 0.668 -14.02* 6.614^ 
  (2.579) (11.62) (5.218) (5.148) (3.805) 
a2: Wife           
 Age  0.462* 0.00951 0.485* 0.921* 0.325* 
  (0.0503) (0.111) (0.123) (0.164) (0.0566) 
Age^2 -0.00631* -0.000618 -0.00668* -0.0119* -0.00434* 
  (0.000627) (0.00131) (0.00150) (0.00200) (0.000716) 
Black -0.806* 0.215 -1.454* 0.0779 -0.712* 
  (0.120) (0.313) (0.353) (0.334) (0.130) 
Education (excluded=Less than High School) 
High School 2.430* 0.497 3.821* 2.753* 0.871 
  (0.277) (0.351) (0.779) (0.984) (0.550) 
Some College 3.098* 0.742^ 5.090* 4.296* 0.862 
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  Full Sample 
Husband 
Less Than 
High School 
Husband 
High School 
Husband 
Some 
College 
Husband 
College or 
More 
  (0.311) (0.427) (0.931) (1.061) (0.540) 
College 3.883* -1.507+ 5.991* 6.539* 1.461* 
  (0.357) (0.721) (1.081) (1.288) (0.558) 
nkids 0-5 -1.511* -0.0800 -1.857* -2.318* -0.970* 
  (0.135) (0.262) (0.348) (0.390) (0.148) 
nkids 6-12 -0.727* -0.130 -0.793* -0.846* -0.551* 
  (0.0855) (0.198) (0.216) (0.233) (0.0969) 
nkids 13-18 -0.0676 0.835* 0.285 -0.310 -0.212* 
  (0.0803) (0.256) (0.226) (0.250) (0.0803) 
Constant -7.282* -7.423* -11.43* -14.30* -3.239* 
  (0.945) (2.765) (2.672) (3.106) (1.071) 
a3 0.524* 1.408* 0.852* 0.623* 0.286* 
  (0.0308) (0.254) (0.0920) (0.0699) (0.0274) 
b12 0.0298* 0.00427 -0.0469^ 0.0401 0.0399+ 
  (0.00918) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0254) (0.0160) 
b13 -0.00264* -0.00331^ -0.00383* -0.00159* -0.00238* 
  (0.000202) (0.00174) (0.000587) (0.000449) (0.000212) 
b22 0.231* 0.139* 0.332* 0.389* 0.126* 
  (0.0166) (0.0256) (0.0431) (0.0500) (0.0178) 
b23 -0.000207+ 0.000822 -0.000531 -0.000185 -0.000109^ 
  (0.0000882) (0.000778) (0.000354) (0.000276) (0.0000650) 
b33 0.0000792* 0.000500* 0.000143* 0.000108* 0.0000338* 
  (0.00000670) (0.000127) (0.0000233) (0.0000168) (0.00000505) 
drho 0.0219^ 0.124* 0.0825* 0.00210 -0.0281 
  (0.0117) (0.0470) (0.0230) (0.0228) (0.0183) 
s1 17.94* 22.52* 19.58* 19.16* 15.10* 
  (0.0993) (0.505) (0.216) (0.211) (0.126) 
s2 23.94* 27.69* 24.29* 22.63* 23.61* 
  (0.156) (0.822) (0.311) (0.281) (0.237) 
N 20163 1502 5401 5233 8027 
LL -149921.9 -9517.4 -39636.0 -39446.3 -60673.0 
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. *, +, ^ => significant at the 99, 95, and 90 percent 
confidence levels, respectively. 
 - D3 - 
Table D.2 Maximum likelihood parameter estimates for single families. 
 Single Males Single Females 
 
Full 
Sample 
Less 
Than 
High 
School 
High 
School 
Some 
College 
College 
or More 
Full 
Sample 
Less 
Than 
High 
School 
High 
School 
Some 
College 
College 
or More 
Marital Status (excluded=Never married)         
Spouse absent 21.40* 94.46^ 21.25+ 25.72^ 0.446 3.702 3.554 3.544 2.256 -0.315 
 
(5.966) (57.42) (9.477) (15.60) (2.096) (3.325) (7.159) (6.481) (6.106) (2.139) 
Separated 10.22+ -32.38 7.203 19.72+ 7.576* -3.184 -8.177^ 0.952 -2.573 -4.610+ 
 (4.302) (30.14) (6.621) (9.609) (2.530) (2.403) (4.790) (4.837) (4.027) (2.021) 
Divorced 12.12* 0.444 11.92* 17.90* 0.530 4.520* -2.038 6.888+ 3.102 0.559 
 (2.639) (15.80) (4.070) (6.201) (1.226) (1.499) (3.982) (3.150) (2.447) (0.974) 
Widow 10.30^ -47.58 8.498 21.21 2.719 0.686 3.945 6.625 -6.003 -9.042* 
 (6.160) (50.20) (9.247) (14.17) (3.410) (2.458) (5.251) (4.765) (4.245) (1.933) 
age 1.352+ -12.11 -1.143 4.471* 1.416* -0.510 -0.725 -2.641* -0.424 1.227* 
 (0.661) (7.582) (0.982) (1.574) (0.347) (0.408) (0.955) (0.856) (0.699) (0.294) 
agesq -0.0336* 0.138 -0.00427 -0.0768* -0.0202* -0.00319 0.00507 0.0220+ -0.00582 -0.0171* 
 (0.00791) (0.0882) (0.0115) (0.0204) (0.00410) (0.00466) (0.0109) (0.00974) (0.00798) (0.00335) 
Non-White -5.070+ 16.45 -3.651 -5.206 -2.065^ -3.638* 6.512+ -4.878^ -5.918* -1.297 
 (2.222) (16.00) (3.483) (4.671) (1.064) (1.287) (3.049) (2.727) (2.188) (0.878) 
Education (excluded=LTH) 
    
     
High School 15.03* 
    
9.526*     
 
(3.321) 
    
(1.987)     
Some College 23.46* 
    
22.23*     
 
(3.830) 
    
(2.247)     
College and Grad 
School 52.76* 
    
43.59*     
 
(5.938) 
    
(3.240)     
# Children 0-5 14.91+ 107.1 18.68+ -1.479 -5.527 -5.018* -4.051 -6.390+ -6.461* -4.150* 
 
(6.082) (67.79) (8.733) (11.71) (5.174) (1.375) (2.806) (2.603) (2.490) (1.305) 
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 Single Males Single Females 
 
Full 
Sample 
Less 
Than 
High 
School 
High 
School 
Some 
College 
College 
or More 
Full 
Sample 
Less 
Than 
High 
School 
High 
School 
Some 
College 
College 
or More 
# Children 6-12 6.124 26.29 2.360 0.923 -0.0249 3.447* -2.585 6.914* 2.212 -1.371 
 
(4.010) (36.45) (6.623) (7.448) (1.865) (1.089) (2.024) (2.465) (1.775) (0.883) 
# Children 13-18 12.97* -7.111 12.63+ 18.29+ -0.963 6.916* 1.791 6.267+ 5.853* -0.525 
 
(3.870) (36.37) (6.168) (7.949) (1.529) (1.311) (2.555) (2.753) (2.185) (0.891) 
_cons -22.17 3.565 32.16^ -36.09 22.66* 9.548 -44.26+ 30.90^ 51.71* 20.40* 
  [11.97] [891.1] [58.27] [13.63] [7.575] [13.94] [68.88] [19.18] [43.88] [6.841] 
a3 12.88* 53.51^ 12.05* 13.16* 0.503* 7.452* 12.03* 10.15* 5.030* 0.924* 
 
(1.223) (28.67) (1.672) (3.035) (0.194) (0.459) (1.172) (1.113) (0.711) (0.197) 
b12 -0.122* -0.314 -0.104* -0.146* -0.00649* -0.0658* 0.0286+ -0.0561* -0.0586* -0.00865* 
 
(0.0144) (0.220) (0.0199) (0.0378) (0.00237) (0.00607) (0.0137) (0.0144) (0.0103) (0.00228) 
b22 0.00070* 0.00956+ 0.000245 -0.000236 0.000049 0.00098* 0.0110* 0.00212* 0.000239 0.00015* 
 
(0.00018) (0.00392) (0.00036) (0.00034) (0.00003) (0.00014) (0.00177) (0.00064) (0.00014) (0.00004) 
sigma1 18.87* 19.66* 20.30* 18.74* 15.70* 19.32* 24.29* 22.46* 20.45* 14.73* 
 
(0.187) (0.777) (0.379) (0.341) (0.257) (0.177) (1.001) (0.463) (0.327) (0.203) 
ll -25598.0 -1692.3 -7672.8 -7577.8 -8371.8 -31297.9 -1830.1 -6844.9 -10531.3 -11669.0 
N 6877 644 2138 1998 2097 8608 763 2061 2810 2974 
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. *, +, ^ => significant at the 99, 95, and 90 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
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Appendix E: Sensitivity analysis related to variation in labor supply elasticities. 
 
 This appendix presents the results of our test of the sensitivity of our estimates of the 
price shock equivalent of unemployment to variation in the labor supply elasticities. We consider 
variations in own wage and non-labor income elasticities, and cross-wage elasticities for married 
families. We assume that other factors remain constant for this exercise. We take the second 
highest and second lowest of each of the elasticities found in the literature (see Figure 1) and 
calculate the change in hours, and hence, change in utility, that would result based on these 
elasticities rather than the ones that we estimate and use to simulate the results in the paper. 
 Suppose our elasticity estimate is given by 𝑒!,!, and the alternate we want to consider is 
given by 𝑒!,!! . For the same percentage change in wages (∆𝑤/𝑤) and the same baseline number 
of hours (ℎ), we can solve for the new change in hours (∆ℎ′) based on the ratio of the two 
elasticities, as follows. 
 The alternate elasticity is given by 𝑒!,!! = !!   ∆!"∆! . Multiply the left side by (Δℎ/Δℎ) and 
re-arrange terms to get ∆ℎ! = !!,!!!!,! Δℎ. So we use the ratio of the alternate elasticity to our 
estimate multiplied by our original estimated change in hours to discern what the change of 
hours (hence, change in utility, etc.) would be under the alternate elasticity. 
 The bars in the chart below reflect the equivalent price level change  estimated for the full 
sample of married families (panel a) and for single men and women (panel b) that result from 
using our own elasticity indicated along the horizontal axis. The gray triangles (gray circles) 
reflect the equivalent change that would result if we use the minimum (maximum) value for that 
elasticity indicated on the horizontal axis that is found in the literature. For the full sample of 
married families, the alternate price shock equivalent estimates range from a low of 3.28 percent 
to a high of 4.08 percent (around our estimate of 4.07 percent). For single men, there is no 
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measurable difference in our price shock equivalent estimates using alternative labor supply 
elasticities. For single women, alternative price shock equivalent estimates only fall below ours 
to 0.23 percnet (relative to our estimate of 0.27 precent).  
Table E.1 Alternative equivalent price level change estimates resulting from using alternative 
labor supply elasticities. 
 
Panel (s): Married families  
 
Panel (b): Singles 
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Appendix F. Welfare loss comparisons by marital status. 
Figure F1. Comparing welfare losses from a price shock vs. an unemployment shock across the income distribution, married families. 
 
(a) Welfare loss from equivalent price level 
change 
 
 
 
(b) Welfare loss from 1pp increase in the 
aggregate unemployment rate (% of total 
income) 
   
(c) Ratio of welfare loss from a price level 
change vs. welfare loss from unemployment 
shock 
 
 
Note: Percent of the sample noted by dashed lines at maximum household income for those in the bottom 20%, the sample median, and the min household income 
for those in the top 20%. Comparable 2015 median household incomes reported for the U.S. by the Census Bureau can be found here: https://goo.gl/XkzVMR. 
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Figure F2. Comparing welfare losses from a price shock vs. an unemployment shock across the income distribution, single families. 
 
(a) Welfare loss from equivalent price level 
change 
 
 
 
(b) Welfare loss from 1pp increase in the 
aggregate unemployment rate (% of total 
income) 
   
(c) Ratio of welfare loss from a price level 
change vs. welfare loss from unemployment 
shock 
 
 
Note: Percent of the sample noted by dashed lines at maximum household income for those in the bottom 20%, the sample median, and the min household income 
for those in the top 20%. Comparable 2015 median household incomes reported for the U.S. by the Census Bureau can be found here: https://goo.gl/XkzVMR. 
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